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Abstract
Interest in recycling of forest products has grown in recent years, one of the goals being to
conserve the stock of trees or possibly increase it to compensate for positive externalities gen-
erated by the forest and neglected by the market. This paper explores the issue as to whether
recycling is an appropriate measure to attain such a goal. We do this by considering the problem
of the private owner of an area of land, who, acting as a price taker, decides how to allocate
his land over time between forestry and some other use, and at what age to harvest the forest
area chosen. Once the forest is cut, he makes a new land allocation decision and replants. He
does so indefinitely, in a Faustmann-like framework. The wood from the harvest is transformed
into a final product which is partly recycled into a substitute for the virgin wood, so that past
output affects the current price. We show that in such a context, increasing the rate of recycling
will result in less area being devoted to forestry. It will also have the effect of increasing the
harvest age of the forest, as long as the planting cost is positive. The net effect on the flow of
virgin wood being harvested to supply the market will as a result be ambiguous. The main point
however is that recycling will result in a smaller, not a larger, stock of trees in the long run. It
would therefore be best to resort to other means if the goal is to increase the stock of trees.
Keywords: Recycling; Forestry; Faustmann Rule; Land Use.
J.E.L. classification: Q15, Q23, Q53.
Re´sume´
L’un des principaux arguments utilise´ pour favoriser le recyclage des produits de la foreˆt est que
cela augmenterait le stock d’arbre, compensant ainsi pour les effets externes positifs de la foreˆt
que ne´gligerait le marche´. Le but de ce papier est d’e´tudier dans quelle mesure la promotion
du recyclage est un instrument approprie´ pour atteindre un tel objectif. Pour ce faire, nous
mode´lisons le comportement d’un proprie´taire prive´ repre´sentatif qui doit de´cider de l’allocation
de sa terre entre la foreˆt et une autre utilisation, et de l’aˆge de coupe de la partie alloue´e a` la
foreˆt. Une fois les arbres coupe´s, il prend une nouvelle de´cision d’allocation de sa terre et reboise.
Le bois re´colte´ est transforme´ en un produit final qui est en partie recycle´ en un substitut au
produit primaire de la coupe, de sorte que le prix courant de´pend de la production passe´e. Nous
montrons qu’accroˆıtre le taux de recyclage a pour re´sultat qu’une plus faible surface sera alloue´e
a` la foreˆt a` long terme. Ceci aura aussi pour effet d’accroˆıtre l’aˆge de coupe de la foreˆt. L’effet
net sur le flux de bois coupe´ pour approvisionner le marche´ sera ambigu. Le point important,
cependant, est que le recyclage re´sultera en un plus petit et non un plus grand stock d’arbres
a` long terme. Il vaudrait donc mieux recourir a` d’autres moyens si l’objectif est d’accroˆıtre le
stock d’arbre.
Mots-cle´s : Recyclage ; Foreˆt ; Re`gle de Faustmann ; Utilisation des sols.
Classification J.E.L. : Q15, Q23, Q53.
1 Introduction
In recent years, it has become fashionable to promote recycling of forest products, in partic-
ular paper. The main argument in favor of encouraging recycling is that it saves trees, the
implicit objective therefore being to end up with a stock of trees which is greater than what
it would be in the absence of recycling. The reason for wanting to increase the standing stock
of trees is that it generates externalities: it procures direct amenities, it protects against soil
erosion and it serves as a carbon sink. To the extent that positive externalities are involved,
the market equilibrium will result in an insufficient stock of trees, which may justify policies
meant to increase it. The purpose of this paper is to consider to what extent the promotion
of recycling is an appropriate means of attaining such a goal.
To do this, we specify a simple dynamic model of land allocation by a private owner
between forestry activities and alternative uses, such as agriculture. The model takes into
account that the product of the forest can be partly recycled and it allows for two decision
variables on the part of the land owner, namely the area of land allocated to forestry at
any time and the age at which the forest is cut and replanted. This enables us to examine
how recycling affects both the long-run equilibrium quantity of forest land and the long-run
cutting age of the forest.
The question of the allocation of land between competing uses is of course, in itself, not
new. For instance, in the recent literature involving use of land for forestry, Barbier and
Burgess (1997) propose an intertemporal model to analyze the optimal conversion of land
from timber to agriculture and use it to estimate the demand relationship for converted land.
McConnell (1989) and Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) examine the optimal allocation of
land between agricultural land, park and public land and urban land in the United States,
using a static model. Ehui, Hertel, and Preckel (1990) use a two-sector dynamic model to
study the optimal allocation of land between agriculture and forestry in a developing country.
This model was also used by Ehui and Hertel (1989) to estimate the optimal steady-state
forest stock in Ivory Coast. Hartwick, Long and Tian (2001) use a two-sector dynamic model
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to analyze land clearing in a small open economy with a large endowment in forestry and
a small endowment in agriculture, and facing given world prices for both agricultural and
forest products. All of those papers treat the output of the forest as being totally consumed
in a single usage and consequently exclude recycling.
Furthermore, whereas the original Faustmann rule (Faustmann, 1849), which is the basic
intertemporal arbitrage rule for determining the optimal forest rotation, takes the land area
planted in forest as given, all of those papers ignore the optimal rotation question and
consider only the land allocation decision, in some cases treating the forest as a nonrenewable
resource. None of them makes use of the Faustmann rule to determine the optimal harvest
age and replanting decisions. The same is true of Darby (1973), who, in a short note, makes
a stylized argument to the effect that recycling paper, by reducing the demand for wood,
will result in less trees being planted. In a sense, this paper formalizes Darby’s argument, by
explicitly setting it into the optimal forest rotation model a` la Faustmann and taking into
account the effect on both the rotation over time and the area devoted to forestry.
We show that increasing the rate of recycling reduces the equilibrium area of land allo-
cated to forestry in steady state and hence reduces the standing stock of trees. On the other
hand, as long as the planting cost is positive, it leads to an increase in the harvest age of
those trees. As a consequence, the effect of increasing the recycling rate on the equilibrium
volume of virgin wood being supplied to the market is ambiguous, being more likely to be
negative the smaller is the planting cost.
The next section serves to describe the model. In Section 3 we solve it and derive the
comparative static results of varying the recycling rate on the steady-state equilibrium. We
end with a few concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 The model
Consider a piece of land of fixed area A, to be allocated by its owner between forestry and
some alternative use, say agriculture. Once the forest is cut, a new allocation is determined
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and the area devoted to forest is immediately planted. This process is repeated indefinitely.
Let i denote the ith such rotation. Then the forest cut at date ti will have been planted at
date ti−1, which is the harvest date of the previous rotation. The cutting age for rotation i
will therefore be Ti = ti − ti−1.
Let X(Ti) denote the volume of wood per unit of area devoted to forestry obtained at age
Ti. The growth function X(Ti) is assumed to be an increasing and strictly concave function of
Ti. If areas fi−1 and ai−1 were assigned respectively to forestry and to agriculture at planting
date ti−1, then the total volume of wood harvested at date ti will be hi = fi−1X(Ti). Since
the total land area will be devoted either to forestry or agriculture, we will have:
fi−1 + ai−1 = A, i = 1, ...,∞. (1)
Any use of the forest other than for the production of wood is neglected by this repre-
sentative land owner. Once harvested, the wood is transformed into some recyclable final
product, say paper. The final product can be equally well produced from virgin wood or
from the recycled product.1 We will assume that this is the only use for the wood being
harvested.
Now let S(ti) denote the total quantity of input available for transformation into final
product at date t. If a fraction δ of the stock available at date ti−1 is recycled, we will have:
S(ti) = fi−1X(Ti) + δS(ti−1), i = 1, ...,∞ (2)
with S(t0) = S0, the given stock available at the initial planting date t0. For simplicity, it
will be assumed that one unit of this input can be transformed into one unit of the final
product. If we let pti denote the price of this input, then the inverse demand can be written:
pti = P (Sti), with P (Sti) ≥ 0 P ′(Sti) < 0 and lim
Sti→∞
P (Sti) = 0. (3)
Note that since virgin wood and the recycled product are perfect substitutes, pti is also the
price of wood.
1That virgin wood and the recycled product are perfect substitutes is a simplifying assumption. Assuming
otherwise does not yield any additional insight towards the issue addressed in this paper.
4
Let c ≥ 0 denote the cutting cost per unit of wood and k ≥ 0 denote the planting cost
per unit of area planted. It will be assumed that P (0) > c, so that it is profitable to exploit
the forest to begin with. The present value at ti−1 of the net benefits from rotation i if an
area fi−1 is planted and it is cut at age Ti will be:
Πf (Ti, fi−1;S(ti)) = [P (S(ti))− c]fi−1X(Ti)e−rTi − kfi−1,
where r is the discount rate. The semi-colon (;) in front of S(ti) is meant to reflect the fact
that the representative land owner will, as a price taker, neglect the effect of his individual
decisions on S(ti).
If an area fi−1 is devoted to forestry, then an area ai−1 = A−fi−1 is devoted to agriculture.
Let g(ai−1) represent the net instantaneous benefit function from agriculture, with g′(ai−1) >
0 and g′′(ai−1) < 0. The present value at ti−1 of the net benefits from agriculture over the
same interval of time Ti will be:
Πa(Ti, ai−1)) =
∫ ti
ti−1
g(ai−1)e−r(τ−ti−1)dτ =
g(ai−1)
r
(1− e−rTi).
The value at ti−1 of the net discounted benefits from total land use over the interval Ti is
therefore:
pii = Π(Ti, fi−1, ai−1;S(ti)) = Πf (Ti, fi−1;S(ti)) + Πa(Ti, ai−1). (4)
3 The equilibrium land allocation and harvesting age
The representative land owner’s decision problem at t0, acting as a price taker, is to choose
the sequence {Ti, fi−1, ai−1}∞i=1 so as to maximize:
V (S0) =
∞∑
i=1
Π(Ti, fi−1, ai−1;S(ti))e−r(ti−1−t0) (5)
subject to (1) and to fi−1 ≥ 0, ai−1 ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,∞. We will hereafter consider only
interior solutions for fi−1 and ai−1, so that the nonnegativity constraints can be ignored.
Substituting for ai−1 from (1) into (5), the problem can then be reformulated as choosing
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the sequence {Ti, fi−1}∞i=1 to maximize:
V (S0) =
∞∑
i=1
Π(Ti, fi−1, A− fi−1;S(ti))e−r(ti−1−t0)
= Π(T1, f0, A− f0;S(t1)) +
∞∑
i=2
Π(Ti, fi−1, A− fi−1;S(ti))e−r
∑i−1
j=1 Tj (6)
where we have used the fact that ti−1 − t0 =
∑i−1
j=1 Tj for i > 1.
The first-order necessary conditions for interior solutions will be given by:
∂V (S0)
∂f0
=
∂pi1
∂f0
− ∂pi1
∂a0
= 0 (7)
∂V (S0)
∂fi−1
= e−r
∑i−1
j=1 Tj
{
∂pii
∂fi−1
− ∂pii
∂ai−1
}
= 0, i = 2, . . . ,∞ (8)
∂V (S0)
∂T1
=
∂pi1
∂T1
− r
∞∑
k=2
pike
−r∑k−1j=1 Tj
=
∂pi1
∂T1
− re−rT1
[
pi2 +
∞∑
j=2
pii+je
−r∑j−1k=1 Ti+k
]
=
∂pi1
∂T1
− re−rT1V (S(t1)) = 0 (9)
∂V (S0)
∂Ti
=
∂pii
∂Ti
e−r
∑i−1
j=1 Tj − r
∞∑
k=i+1
pike
−r∑k−1j=1 Tj
= e−r
∑i−1
j=1 Tj
{
∂pii
∂Ti
− re−rTi
[
pii+1 +
∞∑
j=2
pii+je
−r∑j−1k=1 Ti+k
]}
= e−r
∑i−1
j=1 Tj
{
∂pii
∂Ti
− re−rTiV (S(ti))
}
= 0, i = 2, . . . ,∞, (10)
where the partial derivatives of pii are obtained from (4). After substituting for these, we
find that conditions (7) to (10) will be satisfied if and only if, for all i = 1, . . . ,∞ :
[P (S(ti))− c]X(Ti)e−rTi − k = g
′(A− fi−1)
r
(1− e−rTi) (11)
[P (S(ti))− c]fi−1X ′(Ti) + g(A− fi−1) = r {[P (S(ti))− c]fi−1X(Ti)}+ rV (S(ti)). (12)
The left-hand side of (11) is the net marginal benefit of allocating land to forestry, while
the right-hand side is the net marginal benefit of allocating land to agriculture. The condition
simply says that the net benefit from the marginal unit of land must be the same in the two
allocations.
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Condition (12) says that the net benefit from delaying the cutting age marginally, which
is given by the increment in the volume of wood resulting from forest growth valued at its
net price plus the net benefit from agriculture obtained on area ai−1 during that marginal
delay in cutting the forest, must be equal to the interest on the net benefit foregone from
not harvesting the forest immediately, plus the interest foregone from delaying all future
rotations.
Consider now a steady state, such that Ti = Ti−1 = T , fi = fi−1 = f and S(ti) =
S(ti−1) = S. We then find that, for all i:
V (S(ti)) =
[P (S)− c]fX(t)e−rT − kf
1− e−rT +
g(A− f)
r
,
from which it follows that (11) and (12) become:
F (f, T, S) = [P (S)− c]X(T )e−rT − k − g
′(A− f)
r
(1− e−rT ) = 0 (13)
G(f, T, S) = [P (S)− c]X ′(T )− r (P (S)− c)X(T )− k
1− e−rT = 0. (14)
The steady-state stock of input S available for transformation into the final product is given
by:
S = fX(T )/(1− δ). (15)
Condition (13) says that, given the harvesting age, the area devoted to forestry must
be such as to equate the net marginal benefit between the two possible uses of the land.
Condition (14) says that, given the area devoted to forestry, the harvesting age must be
chosen so as to satisfy the Faustmann rule (Faustmann, 1849). Conditions (13) and (14),
together with (15), determine the steady-state equilibrium area devoted to forestry, f , and
harvesting age, T .
Notice that an interior solution for f is possible only if P (S)−c > 0. For if P (S)−c ≤ 0,
then F (f, T, S) < 0 and no land would be devoted to forestry (f = 0). Notice also that, if
P (S)− c > 0, it follows from (13) and (14) that X ′(T ) > 0. It also follows from (14) that
X ′(T )− rX(T )
1− e−rT =
−rk
(1− e−rT )(P (S)− c) ≤ 0.
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We show in the Appendix that a steady state defined by (13) and (14) will be locally
stable if and only if
4 = FfGT + 1
1− δ [GTFSX(T ) + FfGSfX
′(T )] > 0, (16)
where2
Ff =
g′′(A− f)
r
(
1− e−rT ) < 0 (17)
GT = [P (S)− c][X ′′(T )− rX ′(T )] < 0 (18)
FS = P
′(S)X(T )e−rT < 0 (19)
GS = P
′(S)
[
X ′(T )− rX(T )
1− e−rT
]
=
−rkP ′(S)
(1− e−rT )(P (S)− c) ≥ 0. (20)
To see the impact of the rate of recycling on the long-run equilibrium land allocation and
harvesting age, differentiate totally (13) and (14) taking into account (15), to get:
df
dδ
= − 14
[
fX(T )
(1− δ)2FSGT
]
< 0
dT
dδ
= − 14
[
fX(T )
(1− δ)2FfGS
]
≥ 0.
Therefore, increasing the rate of recycling (from any admissible level, including δ = 0)
results unambiguously in less land being allocated to forestry in the long run and hence a
smaller stock of trees. At the same time, the long run harvest age of those trees will either
increase or stay the same. This means that the overall effect on h = fX(T ), the volume of
virgin wood being supplied to the market, will be ambiguous. This effect is given by
dh
dδ
= fX ′(T )
dT
dδ
+X(T )
df
dδ
= − 14
fX(T )
(1− δ)2 [GTFSX(T ) + FfGSfX
′(T )] .
The sign of this expression is indeterminate. It will depend on whether the longer growth
allowed before harvesting compensates for the smaller area devoted to the forest. One of the
2The second-order conditions for a maximum require Ff ≤ 0, GT ≤ 0 and FfGT ≥ 0, which are all satisfied
given (17) to (20). Notice that Gf ≡ 0 and FT = [P (S)− c][X ′(T )− rX(T )]e−rT − g′(A− f)e−rT = 0 when
(13) and (14) are satisfied.
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important parameters is k, the planting cost. Since GS is increasing in k, so is the marginal
effect of δ on the harvest age T . The reason is that letting the trees grow is a way for the
owner to delay the replanting cost. In particular, if the planting cost is zero, changing the
recycling rate has no effect on the harvest age and the net effect on the volume of virgin
wood supplied to the market is negative. The same holds for small planting costs. But if the
planting cost is sufficiently large, increasing the recycling rate can result in a greater volume
of virgin wood being produced.
4 Concluding remarks
One result that clearly comes out of our analysis is that increasing the rate of recycling will
result in less, not more, land being allocated to forestry in the long run. If the only goal is
to increase the stock of trees in order to compensate for external benefits that are neglected
by the market, it would seem that to encourage recycling is not an appropriate measure.
Measures aimed directly at the land allocation decision are more appropriate, whether they
be incentive mechanisms, such as taxes or subsidies, or regulation aimed at maintaining the
forest area or increasing it. There may of course be other reasons to pursue a recycling
policy, but from the strict standpoint of protecting the forest area it is likely to have the
reverse effect in the long run.
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Appendix
Existence and stability of a steady state
Conditions (11) and (12) yield fi−1(S(ti)) and Ti(S(ti)), the solution for the forest owner’s
decisions for fi−1 and Ti as a function of S(ti), from which we may write hi(S(ti)) =
fi−1(S(ti))X(Ti(S(ti))), the solution for the total volume of wood harvested as a function of
S(ti). Equation (2) therefore becomes:
S(ti) = hi(S(ti)) + δS(ti−1).
In steady state, S(ti) = S(ti−1) = S and hence:
h(S) = (1− δ)S.
The function h(S) takes a positive value at S = 0. This follows directly from (13),
considering that P (0) > c. It also goes to zero as S goes to infinity. This last property holds
because, in view of (3), as S increases it will eventually reach a value S¯ such that P (S¯) = c
and beyond which P (S) − c < 0, with the result that F (f, T, S) < 0 in (13). The value of
f could then not be interior and must be zero: no land would be allocated to forestry by
the land owner and hence h = fX(T ) = 0. The function h(S) being continuous and the
right-hand side of the equation being a monotone increasing function of S that goes through
the origin, it follows that there exists at least one steady state. Such a steady state will be
locally stable if and only if, in its neighborhood,
h′(S) = −GTFSX(T ) + fFfGSX
′(T )
FfGT
< 1− δ,
or, since FfGT > 0 (see (17) and (18)),
4 = FfGT + 1
1− δ [GTFSX(T ) + FfGSfX
′(T )] > 0.
Note h′(S) was obtained by applying Cramer’s rule to the system (13)-(14).
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